II. To the Initial Arguments

411. As to the first argument [n.376]: if you argue uniformly ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’ such that supernaturality refers to the same thing in antecedent and consequent, I concede the consequence, because supernaturality is referred to the entity in the consequent as in the antecedent; but then it does not follow that ‘therefore it can only be supernaturally known’; for this only follows if ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability.

412. But if you understand in the consequent, when ‘supernatural knowable’ is said, that ‘supernatural’ refers to knowability, I deny the consequence ‘it is a supernatural being, therefore it is a supernatural knowable’, because in the antecedent the

‘supernatural’ states relation to its cause, from which it can receive being. ButReading ‘autem’ rather than ‘aliud’ at line 921. ¹⁸ although it might only be able to receive being from a supernatural cause, yet it can be knowable naturally, because however much a thing may be supernaturally put into being, yet after it has been put into being it is a certain natural thing, that is, proportioned to a naturally knowing or naturally cognitive power.

413. Hence is plain the response to the adduced proof that ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’, because if ‘supernatural’ in each place determines per se what it is added to, the consequent can be conceded like the antecedent, and then the minor that ‘this existence is a supernatural knowable’ is false. But if ‘supernatural’ does not determine per se what it is added to but something else implied, as ‘[makeable/knowable] being’, the consequence is not valid. For in the antecedent ‘supernatural’ per se determines this being under the idea of makeable and so is repugnant to what is meant by ‘to be made naturally’, while in the consequent ‘spiritual’ does not determine the knowable but the ‘to be made’, and so is not repugnant to it being known naturally.The argument is ‘a supernatural makeable is not naturally makeable, therefore a supernatural knowable is not naturally knowable’. So if, first, the latter clause or consequent means ‘a knowable only supernaturally is not a knowable naturally’ (as the former clause or antecedent means ‘a makeable only supernaturally is not a makeable naturally’) then the consequence can be allowed but the minor premise to complete the inference ‘this existence [of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is a supernatural knowable’ is false. For it now means ‘this existence is knowable only supernaturally’ but in fact, despite being made supernaturally, this existence could still be knowable naturally (just as the world was supernaturally made but is naturally knowable to human beings). If, second, the term ‘being’ or ‘thing’ is added to the consequence so that it reads: ‘a supernatural makeable thing is not a natural makeable thing, so a supernatural knowable thing is not a natural knowable thing’, then the consequent is not about knowability but about makeability (as is also the antecedent). For the sense is ‘a knowable thing made supernaturally is not a knowable thing made naturally’, which is true but says nothing about whether what is thus made supernaturally is knowable naturally or not. ¹⁹

414. To the second [n.377] I say that this proposition is false, namely ‘whatever is known by faith exceeds whatever is knowable naturally’ when speaking of what is knowable by abstract intellect. But it is true when speaking of what is knowable naturally by our intellect in our present state as wayfarers; and therefore faith in it [sc. Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is necessary for us but not for the abstract intellect.

415. The reason for this denial is plain enough, because angels were intuitively able naturally to know Christ suffering and dying, just as they were able to know naturally his being alive with human life, but we have knowledge of faith about the death. Now the angels’ intuitive knowledge was much more perfect than our obscure knowledge about the same object. Thus do I speak about the existence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.

416. As to the third argument about the bad angels [n.378], I say that, if any bad angel be permitted to use his natural cognitive power, he could understand any created intelligible thing, and consequently could understand the thoughts of hearts and the mysteries of grace as soon as they are posited in fact. But, as the Master says in Sent. II d.7 ch.10, angels can do many things of their nature that are not permitted to them; and so the supposition is made that a bad angel is not permitted to see the secrets of the heart. And in this way, and in no other, could he see the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Thus too must one suppose that bad angels are not permitted to see the mysteries of grace.

417. And in this way must the authority of Ambrose be understood about the mystery of the Incarnation [n.379] - not absolutely, such that no bad angel could see or know the integrity of Mary, both in mind and in body, as he can know just as well the touch of finger on finger or any intellect’s natural intellection. But he was not permitted to do so for definite reasons, so that our redemption might not be impeded. “For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory” [I Corinthians 2.8], that is, they would never have procured my redemption by his death.

418. As to the confirmation from Damascene [n.380], I say that he is speaking about us in this present state, although one doctor [William of Ware] says that he is speaking both of angels and of us. But this cannot be true when speaking of the natural power of the angelic intellect (as was proved in the second conclusion of the solution [n.398]), but only of his power as he is permitted; and this about the evil angel.

419. As to the fourth [n.381] I say that a contingent thing as contingent, namely while it is in its cause, cannot be known by a created intellect. But to whatever extent something exists contingently in its cause, yet, after it has been contingently posited in existence, there can be determinate knowledge of it just as it now has determinate being, and that in any intellect that has regard to the whole of being. Therefore, although some intellect not be able to foreknow that the body of Christ will be contained in this host, yet once this has been done in fact, an intellect can very well naturally intuit Christ’s body existing there.